I am glad you are tackling the complexity question Gunnar. This was something forced on me many years ago. As an antiwar activist from 1968-1975, I started asking questions and then researching the answers. The first one was, "How did the US get involved in this insane war in Vietnam?" This led to the second question, "What in the hell is wrong with the US?" And then of course there was the third question, "What are we going to do about it?" Since I had been doing archaeology in the field in 1968 and 1969, I quite naturally gravitated to an anthropological and social science orientation. This led to collapse and complexity studies. It is no accident that Joseph Tainter is an archaeologist. Another archaeologist who looked at these kinds of questions and who I highly recommend is Ian Morris, especially his 2010 book, Why the West Rules - For Now.
I looked at the 2011 Tainter article you mentioned and it is behind a paywall, but the abstract and blurb I could read gives the gist of his position. He says, "The common view of history assumes that complexity and resource consumption have emerged through innovation facilitated by surplus energy. This view leads to the supposition that complexity and consumption are voluntary, and that we can therefore achieve a sustainable future through conservation. Such an assumption is substantially incorrect. History suggests that complexity most commonly increases to solve problems, and compels increase in resource use."
I disagree based on Tainter's predisposition for integrative theory. In The Collapse of Complex Societies (1988), Tainter mentions conflict theory vs. integrative theory. Conflict theory argues that societies become more complex because the elites strive for more control and more power. Integrative theory argues that societies become more complex because they solve problems. Think capitalists exploiting workers vs. an administrative state that regulates irrigation so that everyone benefits from increased food production. Tainter acknowledges that conflict theory has some good points but comes down on the side of integrative theory. This is the origin of his "problem solving" paradigm, as noted in the article abstract quoted above. I default to conflict theory, based on my experience in over fifty years of research, as well as a political education in the streets trying to stop an insane war. The anti-insane war activities also led to alternative efforts in food co-ops, food growing, starting farmers markets, teaching sustainable methods, etc. The bottom line is that the administrative state is not there to provide benefits for all. It was not so in ancient Sumer, nor in Rome, nor in the 21st century. One could make an argument that I am looking at this issue from a perspective that has already witnessed an inflection point in marginal returns, but that objection really doesn't fly. Ancient Sumer saw collapse BECAUSE of the elite control of the administrative state, as did Bronze Age Mycenae, ancient Rome, the Maya, etc. This argues for control of the administrative state by the elites for their own ends right from the beginning.
Like many anthropologists, Joseph Tainter has a vested interest in his career, which depends on a state-level society with surplus for professors. My particular work doesn't. One should look long and hard at how people make a living and whether that colors their research and conclusions. That said, I still regard Tainter's 1988 book as very important. It provides a sound basis in conflict vs. integrative theory, adds in marginal returns and uses case studies to illustrate his points. He also - which I think is most important - mentions that when a society collapses, it declines into regional polities. This is Tainter's most important point, in my opinion.
There's a possible synthesis here between all our comments, complexity is deployed to solve problems *for elites*. The problem in question being how to compete with other elites without directly killing them and taking their land/resources. In our current arrangement this takes the form of capitalist growth. Increasing complexity, i.e. growth provides ever new grounds for elite competition, and creates new elites which can aid stability (for a time).
Unfortunately for non-elites/workers, elite competition (growth) can be beneficial while being destructive as it requires those in power to hand out every greater goods. i.e. competing firms in a growing industry raising wages when they otherwise would rather not.
My program is, "How to pick up the pieces after collapse, while also making positive gains in the short-term and mid-term." This means providing food while others conduct the local meetings and formulate new strategies.
If possible, please set up a BlueSky account so I can refer your post to others I correspond with others on sustainability
Finally, my great great grandfather is from Skurup, Skaine, Sweden .. where his son Olaf migrated to US early 1900s ending up w a 20 acre parcel in Iowa
This is one of the rare pieces that gets close to the core: complexity isn’t just a technical challenge—it’s an energetic and moral one. From a heliogenetic perspective, the answer isn’t to simplify society by force or accept inequality as inevitable. It’s to re-pattern our energy sources and align with the limits and abundance of solar-regenerative systems.
Arne Næss taught that real progress respects both inner depth and outer ecology. So instead of managing collapse or accelerating inequality, what if we designed systems that grow complexity without exploitation—systems powered not by extraction, but by the sun?
The future isn’t less complex. It’s more coherent.
Only knowing Tainter through secondary sources, I must admit I was surprised to discover that he is all-in on increasing complexity – though Walter's point about looking to the material conditions of a thinker's work and how it colours their conclusions is well made.
Relevant to bluejay's scepticism on the art/literature front, I've been thinking lately about the dynamic between societal complexity (the focus of Tainter, etc) and cultural complexity. I think these are two distinct characteristics which don't track together in any straightforward way. A good deal of what appears as societal complexity is underpinned by brutal simplification in both the ecological and the cultural landscape – Anna Tsing's chapter on scale in The Mushroom at the End of the World is relevant here, as is her term 'the Plantation-ocene', which points to the brutal simplification of both plant and human life on plantations as foundational for what is ordinarily represented as the unprecedented societal complexity of modern industrial society. This isn't to say that there aren't types of 'sophisticated' cultural activity which correspond to societal complexity (opera houses, modern universities).
It struck me the other day that a good part of my own work could be seen as composting the sophisticated outputs of academic theory, breaking loose useful fragments, a few of which might just end up as part of an oral culture a few generations hence. And, perhaps because of my own non-institutional setting and place in the timeline of collapse, I don't feel as though there's anything tragic about this – the reworkings of fragments from Max Weber or Karl Polanyi or Anna Tsing that I carry around seem more helpful than the way the work of these thinkers get put on pedestals or used in the disciplinary game-playing of academic careers.
Anyway, thanks for the post and the interesting discussion!
In my very first anthropology class in 1968, the prof said the most important thing I have ever heard about culture; "Every culture is complex." So, a group of hunter gatherers with a band or tribe organization have a complex culture but a rather simple society - at least in comparison to state-level societies. Julian Steward quantified this by number of culture traits. The Shoshone tribes, in his example, had a far lower number of cultural traits than modern states. Of course the delineation of culture vs. society leads inevitably to the individual as the base unit of culture. This doesn't sit well with the Durkheimian acolytes, who conceptualize the group as the base unit of culture. In this particular debate, I usually just point out that when the last native speaker dies, the culture dies, even though this one individual had outlasted his/her group. And of course many people - especially fellow anthropologists! - will disagree. As an example of this, I was too argumentative for law school, but not argumentative enough for grad school in anthropology. So Gunnar's post will likely generate a lot of good conceptual thinking.
"I was too argumentative for law school, but not argumentative enough for grad school in anthropology."
Ha! That made me chuckle, especially as I just had to read and comment on some chapters by an anthropologist who was a participant-observer in a project of mine.
Interesting observation about the difference between "social" and "cultural" complexity Dougald. Social in this context includes the technosphere and the economy of course. I must admit that I haven't read Tsing, even if I have seen several interesting references to her (to do list...)
What if we didn't though? What if instead of trying to replace whole system we just setup small solar arrays on farms, and built small cottages that would last more than 30 years for people to live in. If cars were removed the existing roads would work for bike transport for several decades. We could keep some hospitals open around the last few power plants.
I do think the push for the next innovation is more a symptom of capital searching for growth than any real need to solve human problems. (At least here in the rich world)
I do wonder though if the fear of a dark age in a simpler society as measured by art and literature is mostly an elite fear. At least personally, less economic activity (i.e. wage labor) is correlated to more art and writing getting done. Of course I'm still dependent on the machine, but if that ceased it would ideally look like a shift in my cultural output from writing to doing, i.e. less time on substack and more time on how to prune the new pears trees to look pleasing to the eye and be productive. Of course that sort of thing would be hard for a future historian to dig up.
Bluejay. "I do think the push for the next innovation is more a symptom of capital searching for growth than any real need to solve human problems."
That is also in line with my own analysis.
I also agree with that claim by Tainter that art and literature would vanish in a "collapse" is not plausible. In the article I didn't want to refute or argue against everything Tainter or Wilkinson say, but rather focus on a few pertinent things.
You are on the right track. After the Black Death, peasants could demand higher wages. If you are interested in this kind of thing, I recommend The Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History by David Hackett Fischer (1996).
I am glad you are tackling the complexity question Gunnar. This was something forced on me many years ago. As an antiwar activist from 1968-1975, I started asking questions and then researching the answers. The first one was, "How did the US get involved in this insane war in Vietnam?" This led to the second question, "What in the hell is wrong with the US?" And then of course there was the third question, "What are we going to do about it?" Since I had been doing archaeology in the field in 1968 and 1969, I quite naturally gravitated to an anthropological and social science orientation. This led to collapse and complexity studies. It is no accident that Joseph Tainter is an archaeologist. Another archaeologist who looked at these kinds of questions and who I highly recommend is Ian Morris, especially his 2010 book, Why the West Rules - For Now.
I looked at the 2011 Tainter article you mentioned and it is behind a paywall, but the abstract and blurb I could read gives the gist of his position. He says, "The common view of history assumes that complexity and resource consumption have emerged through innovation facilitated by surplus energy. This view leads to the supposition that complexity and consumption are voluntary, and that we can therefore achieve a sustainable future through conservation. Such an assumption is substantially incorrect. History suggests that complexity most commonly increases to solve problems, and compels increase in resource use."
I disagree based on Tainter's predisposition for integrative theory. In The Collapse of Complex Societies (1988), Tainter mentions conflict theory vs. integrative theory. Conflict theory argues that societies become more complex because the elites strive for more control and more power. Integrative theory argues that societies become more complex because they solve problems. Think capitalists exploiting workers vs. an administrative state that regulates irrigation so that everyone benefits from increased food production. Tainter acknowledges that conflict theory has some good points but comes down on the side of integrative theory. This is the origin of his "problem solving" paradigm, as noted in the article abstract quoted above. I default to conflict theory, based on my experience in over fifty years of research, as well as a political education in the streets trying to stop an insane war. The anti-insane war activities also led to alternative efforts in food co-ops, food growing, starting farmers markets, teaching sustainable methods, etc. The bottom line is that the administrative state is not there to provide benefits for all. It was not so in ancient Sumer, nor in Rome, nor in the 21st century. One could make an argument that I am looking at this issue from a perspective that has already witnessed an inflection point in marginal returns, but that objection really doesn't fly. Ancient Sumer saw collapse BECAUSE of the elite control of the administrative state, as did Bronze Age Mycenae, ancient Rome, the Maya, etc. This argues for control of the administrative state by the elites for their own ends right from the beginning.
Like many anthropologists, Joseph Tainter has a vested interest in his career, which depends on a state-level society with surplus for professors. My particular work doesn't. One should look long and hard at how people make a living and whether that colors their research and conclusions. That said, I still regard Tainter's 1988 book as very important. It provides a sound basis in conflict vs. integrative theory, adds in marginal returns and uses case studies to illustrate his points. He also - which I think is most important - mentions that when a society collapses, it declines into regional polities. This is Tainter's most important point, in my opinion.
There's a possible synthesis here between all our comments, complexity is deployed to solve problems *for elites*. The problem in question being how to compete with other elites without directly killing them and taking their land/resources. In our current arrangement this takes the form of capitalist growth. Increasing complexity, i.e. growth provides ever new grounds for elite competition, and creates new elites which can aid stability (for a time).
Unfortunately for non-elites/workers, elite competition (growth) can be beneficial while being destructive as it requires those in power to hand out every greater goods. i.e. competing firms in a growing industry raising wages when they otherwise would rather not.
My program is, "How to pick up the pieces after collapse, while also making positive gains in the short-term and mid-term." This means providing food while others conduct the local meetings and formulate new strategies.
Excellent post .. many great points.
If possible, please set up a BlueSky account so I can refer your post to others I correspond with others on sustainability
Finally, my great great grandfather is from Skurup, Skaine, Sweden .. where his son Olaf migrated to US early 1900s ending up w a 20 acre parcel in Iowa
Regards
This is one of the rare pieces that gets close to the core: complexity isn’t just a technical challenge—it’s an energetic and moral one. From a heliogenetic perspective, the answer isn’t to simplify society by force or accept inequality as inevitable. It’s to re-pattern our energy sources and align with the limits and abundance of solar-regenerative systems.
Arne Næss taught that real progress respects both inner depth and outer ecology. So instead of managing collapse or accelerating inequality, what if we designed systems that grow complexity without exploitation—systems powered not by extraction, but by the sun?
The future isn’t less complex. It’s more coherent.
Only knowing Tainter through secondary sources, I must admit I was surprised to discover that he is all-in on increasing complexity – though Walter's point about looking to the material conditions of a thinker's work and how it colours their conclusions is well made.
Relevant to bluejay's scepticism on the art/literature front, I've been thinking lately about the dynamic between societal complexity (the focus of Tainter, etc) and cultural complexity. I think these are two distinct characteristics which don't track together in any straightforward way. A good deal of what appears as societal complexity is underpinned by brutal simplification in both the ecological and the cultural landscape – Anna Tsing's chapter on scale in The Mushroom at the End of the World is relevant here, as is her term 'the Plantation-ocene', which points to the brutal simplification of both plant and human life on plantations as foundational for what is ordinarily represented as the unprecedented societal complexity of modern industrial society. This isn't to say that there aren't types of 'sophisticated' cultural activity which correspond to societal complexity (opera houses, modern universities).
It struck me the other day that a good part of my own work could be seen as composting the sophisticated outputs of academic theory, breaking loose useful fragments, a few of which might just end up as part of an oral culture a few generations hence. And, perhaps because of my own non-institutional setting and place in the timeline of collapse, I don't feel as though there's anything tragic about this – the reworkings of fragments from Max Weber or Karl Polanyi or Anna Tsing that I carry around seem more helpful than the way the work of these thinkers get put on pedestals or used in the disciplinary game-playing of academic careers.
Anyway, thanks for the post and the interesting discussion!
In my very first anthropology class in 1968, the prof said the most important thing I have ever heard about culture; "Every culture is complex." So, a group of hunter gatherers with a band or tribe organization have a complex culture but a rather simple society - at least in comparison to state-level societies. Julian Steward quantified this by number of culture traits. The Shoshone tribes, in his example, had a far lower number of cultural traits than modern states. Of course the delineation of culture vs. society leads inevitably to the individual as the base unit of culture. This doesn't sit well with the Durkheimian acolytes, who conceptualize the group as the base unit of culture. In this particular debate, I usually just point out that when the last native speaker dies, the culture dies, even though this one individual had outlasted his/her group. And of course many people - especially fellow anthropologists! - will disagree. As an example of this, I was too argumentative for law school, but not argumentative enough for grad school in anthropology. So Gunnar's post will likely generate a lot of good conceptual thinking.
"I was too argumentative for law school, but not argumentative enough for grad school in anthropology."
Ha! That made me chuckle, especially as I just had to read and comment on some chapters by an anthropologist who was a participant-observer in a project of mine.
Interesting observation about the difference between "social" and "cultural" complexity Dougald. Social in this context includes the technosphere and the economy of course. I must admit that I haven't read Tsing, even if I have seen several interesting references to her (to do list...)
What if we didn't though? What if instead of trying to replace whole system we just setup small solar arrays on farms, and built small cottages that would last more than 30 years for people to live in. If cars were removed the existing roads would work for bike transport for several decades. We could keep some hospitals open around the last few power plants.
I do think the push for the next innovation is more a symptom of capital searching for growth than any real need to solve human problems. (At least here in the rich world)
I do wonder though if the fear of a dark age in a simpler society as measured by art and literature is mostly an elite fear. At least personally, less economic activity (i.e. wage labor) is correlated to more art and writing getting done. Of course I'm still dependent on the machine, but if that ceased it would ideally look like a shift in my cultural output from writing to doing, i.e. less time on substack and more time on how to prune the new pears trees to look pleasing to the eye and be productive. Of course that sort of thing would be hard for a future historian to dig up.
Bluejay. "I do think the push for the next innovation is more a symptom of capital searching for growth than any real need to solve human problems."
That is also in line with my own analysis.
I also agree with that claim by Tainter that art and literature would vanish in a "collapse" is not plausible. In the article I didn't want to refute or argue against everything Tainter or Wilkinson say, but rather focus on a few pertinent things.
You are on the right track. After the Black Death, peasants could demand higher wages. If you are interested in this kind of thing, I recommend The Great Wave: Price Revolutions and the Rhythm of History by David Hackett Fischer (1996).
Added to my ever growing to-read list.